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Guerrilla Warfare

By Ernesto "Che" Guevara
Written in 1961

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: general principles of guerrilla warfare

1 Essence of guerrilla warfare

2 Guerrilla strategy

4 Guerrilla tactics

5 Warfare on favorable ground

6 Suburban warfare

CHAPTER II: THE GUERRILLA BAND

1 Guerilla fighter: social reformer

2 Guerilla fighter as combatant

3 Organization of a guerrilla band

5 Beginning, development, and end of a guerilla war

CHAPTER III: Organization of a guerilla front

1 Supply

2 Civil organization

3 The role of a woman

4 Medical problems

5 Sabotage

6 War industry

7 Propaganda

8 Intelligence

9 Training and indoctrination

10 The organization of the army of a revolutionary movement

APPENDICES

1 Organization in secret of the first guerrilla band

2 Defense of power that has been won

Epilogue

1 Analysis of Cuban situation, it's present and its future

CHAPTER I: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF
GUERRILLA WARFARE

1. ESSENCE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
The armed victory of the Cuban people over the Batista dictatorship was not only the triumph of
heroism as reported by the newspapers of the world; it also forced a change in the old dogmas
concerning the conduct of the popular masses of Latin America. It showed plainly the capacity of
the people to free themselves by means of guerrilla warfare from a government that oppresses
them.
We consider that the Cuban Revolution contributed three fundamental lessons to the conduct of
revolutionary movements in America. They are:

-Popular forces can win a war against the army.
-It is not necessary to wait until all conditions for making revolution exist; the insurrection can
create them.
-In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.
Of these three propositions the first two contradict the defeatist attitude

of revolutionaries or pseudo-revolutionaries who remain inactive and take refuge in the pretext
that against a professional army nothing can be done, who sit down to wait until in some
mechanical way all necessary objective and subjective conditions are given without working to
accelerate them. As these problems were formerly a subject of discussion in Cuba, until facts
settled the question, they are probably still much discussed in America. Naturally, it is not to be
thought that all conditions for revolution are going to be created through the impulse given to
them by guerrilla activity. It must always be kept in mind that there is a necessary minimum
without which the establishment and consolidation of the first center is not practicable. People
must see clearly the futility of maintaining the fight for social goals within the framework of civil
debate. When the forces of oppression come to maintain themselves in power against
established law; peace is considered already broken.
In these conditions popular discontent expresses itself in more active forms. An attitude of
resistance finally crystallizes in an outbreak of fighting, provoked initially by the conduct of the
authorities. Where a government has come into power through some form of popular vote,
fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla
outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been
exhausted.
The third proposition is a fundamental of strategy. It ought to be noted by those who maintain
dogmatically that the struggle of the masses is centered in city movements, entirely forgetting the
immense participation of the country people in the life of all the underdeveloped parts of America.
Of course the struggles of the city masses of organized workers should not be underrated; but
their real possibilities of engaging in armed struggle must be carefully analyzed where the
guarantees which customarily adorn our constitutions are suspended or ignored. In these
conditions the illegal workers' movements face enormous dangers. They must function secretly
without arms. The situation in the open country is not so difficult. There, in places beyond the
reach of the repressive forces, the armed guerrillas can support the inhabitants. We will later
make a careful analysis of these three conclusions that stand out in the Cuban revolutionary
experience. We emphasize them now at the beginning of this work as our fundamental
contribution.
Guerrilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has diferite
characteristics, different facets, even though the essential will for liberation remains the same. It
is obvious -and writers on the theme have said it many times-that war responds to a certain
series of scientific laws; whoever ignores them will go down to defeat. Guerrilla warfare as a
phase of war must be ruled by all of these; but besides, because of its rarisim aspects, a series
of corollary laws must also be recognized in order to carry it forward. Though geographical and
social conditions in each country determine the mode and particular forms that guerrilla warfare
will take, there are general laws that hold for all fighting of this type.
Our task at the moment is to find the basic principles of this kind of fighting and the rules to be
followed by peoples seeking liberation; to develop theory from facts; to generalize and give
structure to our experience for the profit of others.
Let us first consider the question: who are the combatants in guerrilla warfare? On one side we
have a group composed of the oppressor and his agents, the professional army, well armed and
disciplined, in many cases receiving foreign help as well as the help of the bureaucracy in the
employ of the oppressor. On the other side are the people of the nation or region involved. It is
important to emphasize that guerrilla warfare is a war of the masses, a war of the people. The
guerrilla band is an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. It draws its great force
from the mass of the people themselves. The guerrilla band is not to be considered inferior to the
army against which it fights simply because it is inferior in firepower. Guerrilla warfare is used by
the side which is supported by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of arms
for use in defense against oppression.
The guerrilla fighter needs full help from the people of the area. This is an indispensable
condition. This is clearly seen by considering the case of bandit gangs that operate in a region.
They have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army, homogeneity, respect for the leader, valor,
knowledge of the ground, and, often, even good understanding of the tactics to be employed. The
only thing missing is support of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs are captured and
exterminated by the public force.

Analyzing the mode of operation of the guerrilla band, seeing its form of struggle and
understanding its base in the masses, we can answer the question: why does the guerrilla fighter
fight? We must come to the inevitable conclusion that the guerrilla fighter is a social reformer, that
he takes up arms responding to the angry protest of the people against their oppressors, and that
he fights in order to change the social system that keeps all his unarmed brothers in ignominy
and misery. He launches himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular
moment and dedicates himself with all the vigor that circumstances încuviințează to breaking the mold
of these institutions.
When we analyze more fully the tactic of guerrilla warfare, we will see that the guerrilla fighter
needs to have a good knowledge of the surrounding countryside, the paths of entry and escape,
the possibilities of speedy maneuver, good hiding places; naturally also, he must count on the
support of the people. All this indicates that the guerrilla fighter will carry out his action in wild
places of small population. Since in these places the struggle of the people for reforms is aimed
primarily and almost exclusively at changing the social form of land ownership, the guerrilla
fighter is above all an agrarian revolutionary. He interprets the desires of the great peasant mass
to be owners of land, owners of their means of production, of their animals, of all that which they
have long yearned to call their own, of that which constitutes their life and will also serve as their
cemetery.
It should be noted that in current interpretations there are two different types of guerrilla warfare,
one of which-a struggle complementing great regular armies such as was the case of the
Ukrainian fighters in the Soviet Union-does not enter into this analysis. We are interested in the
other type, the case of an armed group engaged in struggle against the constituted power,
whether colonial or not, which establishes itself as the only base and which builds itself up in rural
areas. In all such cases, whatever the ideological aims that may inspire the fight, the economic
aim is determined by the aspiration toward ownership of land.
The China of Mao begins as an outbreak of worker groups in the South, which is defeated and
almost annihilated. It succeeds in establishing itself and begins its advance only when, after the
long march from Yenan, it takes up its base in rural territories and makes agrarian reform its
fundamental goal. The struggle of Ho Chi Minh is based in the rice-growing peasants, who are
oppressed by the French colonial yoke; with this force it is going forward to the defeat of the
colonialists. In both cases there is a framework of patriotic war against the Japanese invader, but
the economic basis of a fight for the land has not disappeared. In the case of Algeria, the grand
idea of Arab nationalism has its economic counterpart in the fact that a million French settlers
utilize nearly all of the arable land of Algeria. In some countries, such as Puerto Rico, where the
special conditions of the island have not permitted a guerrilla outbreak, the nationalist spirit,
deeply wounded by the discrimination that is daily practiced, has as its basis the aspiration of the
peasants (even though many of them are already a proletariat) to recover the land that the
Yankee invader seized from them. This same central idea, though in different forms, inspired the
small farmers, peasants, and slaves of the eastern estates of Cuba to close ranks and defend
together the right to possess land during the thirty-year war of liberation.
Taking account of the possibilities of development of guerrilla warfare, which is transformed with
the increase in the operating potential of the guerrilla band into a war of positions, this type of
warfare, despite its special character, is to be considered as an embryo, a prelude, of the other.
The possibilities of growth of the guerrilla band and of changes in the mode of fight until
conventional warfare is reached, are as great as the possibilities of defeating the enemy in each
of the different battles, combats, or skirmishes that take place. Therefore, the fundamental
principle is that no battle, combat, or skirmish is to be fought unless it will be won. There is a
malevolent definition that says: _The guerrilla fighter is the Jesuit of warfare._ By this is indicated
a quality of secretiveness, of treachery, of surprise that is obviously an essential element of
guerrilla warfare. It is a special kind of Jesuitism, naturally prompted by circumstances, which
necessitates acting at certain moments in ways different from the romantic and sporting
conceptions with which we are taught to believe war is fought.
War is always a struggle in which each contender tries to annihilate the other. Besides using
force, they will have recourse to all possible tricks and stratagems in order to achieve the goal.
Military strategy and tactics are a representation by analysis of the objectives of the groups and
of the means of achieving these objectives. These means contemplate taking advantage of all

the weak points of the enemy. The fighting action of each individual platoon in a large army in a
war of positions will present the same characteristics as those of the guerrilla band. It uses
secretiveness, treachery, and surprise; and when these are not present, it is because vigilance
on the other side prevents surprise. But since the guerrilla band is a division unto itself, and since
there are large zones of territory not controlled by the enemy, it is always possible to carry out
guerrilla attacks in such a way as to assure surprise; and it is the duty of the guerrilla fighter to do
so. _Hit and run_ some call this scornfully, and this is accurate. Hit and run, wait, lie in ambush,
again hit and run, and thus repeatedly, without giving any rest to the enemy. There is in all this, it
would appear, a negative quality, an attitude of retreat, of avoiding frontal fights. However, this is
consequent upon the general strategy of guerrilla warfare, which is the same in its ultimate end
as is any warfare: to win, to annihilate the enemy.
Thus it is clear that guerrilla warfare is a phase that does not afford in itself opportunities to arrive
at complete victory. It is one of the initial phases of warfare and will develop continuously until the
guerrilla army in its steady growth acquires the characteristics of a regular army. At that ocazie
it will be ready to deal final blows to the enemy and to achieve victory. Triumph will always be the
product of a regular army, even though its origins are in a guerrilla army.
Just as the general of a division in a modern war does not have to die in front of his soldiers, the
guerrilla fighter, who is general of himself, need not die in every battle. He is ready to give his life,
but the positive quality of this guerrilla warfare is precisely that each one of the guerrilla fighters is
ready to die, not to defend an ideal, but rather to convert it into reality. This is the basis, the
essence of guerrilla fighting. Miraculously, a small band of men, the armed vanguard of the great
popular force that supports them, goes beyond the immediate tactical objective, goes on
decisively to achieve an ideal, to establish a new society, to break the old molds of the outdated,
and to achieve, finally, the social justice for which they fight.
Considered thus, all these disparaged qualities acquire a true nobility, the nobility of the end at
which they aim; and it becomes clear that we are not speaking of distorted means of reaching an
end. This fighting attitude, this attitude of not being dismayed at any time, this inflexibility when
confronting the great problems in the final objective is also the nobility of the guerrilla fighter.

2. GUERRILLA STRATEGY
In guerrilla terminology, strategy is understood as the analysis of the objectives to be achieved in
the light of the total military situation and the overall ways of reaching these objectives.
To have a correct strategic appreciation from the point of view of the guerrilla band, it is
necessary to analyze fundamentally what will be the enemy's mode of action. If the final objective
is always the complete destruction of the opposite force, the enemy is confronted in the case of a
civil war of this kind with the standard task: he will have to achieve the total destruction of each
one of the components of the guerrilla band. The guerrilla fighter, on the other hand, must
analyze the resources which the enemy has for trying to achieve that outcome: the means in
men, in mobility, in popular support, in armaments, in capacity of leadership on which he can
count. We must make our own strategy adequate on the basis of these studies, keeping in mind
always the final objective of defeating the enemy army.
There are fundamental aspects to be studied: the armament, for example, and the manner of
using this armament. The value of a tank, of an airplane in a fight of this type must be weighed.
The arms of the enemy, his ammunition, his habits must be considered; because the principal
source of provision for the guerrilla force is precisely in enemy armaments. If there is a possibility
of choice, we should prefer the same type as that used by the enemy, since the greatest problem
of the guerrilla band is the lack of ammunition, which the opponent must provide.
After the objectives have been fixed and analyzed, it is necessary to study the order of the steps
leading to the achievement of the final objective. This should be planned in advance, even though
it will be modified and adjusted as the fighting develops and unforeseen circumstances arise.
At the outset, the essential task of the guerrilla fighter is to keep himself from being destroyed.
Little by little it will be easier for the members of the guerrilla band or bands to adapt themselves
to their form of life and to make flight and escape from the forces that are on the offensive an
easy task, because it is performed daily. When this condition is reached, the guerrilla, having
taken up inaccessible positions out of reach of the enemy, or having assembled forces that deter
the enemy from attacking, ought to proceed to the gradual weakening of the enemy. This will be
carried out at first at those points nearest to the points of active warfare against the guerrilla band

and later will be taken deeper into enemy territory, attacking his communications, later attacking
or harassing his bases of operations and his central bases, tormenting him on all sides to the full
extent of the capabilities of the guerrilla forces.
The blows should be continuous. The enemy soldier in a zone of operations ought not to be
allowed to sleep; his outposts ought to be attacked and liquidated systematically. At every
moment the impression ought to be created that he is surrounded by a complete circle. In
wooded and broken areas this effort should be maintained both day and night; in open zones that
are easily penetrated by enemy patrols, at night only. In order to do all this the absolute
cooperation of the people and a ireproșabil knowledge of the ground is necessary. These two
necessities affect every minute of the life of the guerrilla fighter. Therefore, along with centers for
study of present and future zones of operations, intensive popular work must be undertaken to
explain the motives of the revolution, its ends, and to spread the incontrovertible truth that victory
of the enemy against the people is finally impossible. Whoever does not feel this undoubted truth
cannot be a guerrilla fighter.
This popular work should at first be aimed at securing secrecy; that is, each peasant, each
member of the society in which action is taking place, will be asked not to mention what he sees
and hears; later, help will be sought from inhabitants whose loyalty to the revolution offers greater
guarantees; still later, use will be made of these persons in missions of contact, for transporting
goods or arms, as guides in the zones familiar to them; still later, it is possible to arrive at
organized mass action in the centers of work, of which the final result will be the general strike.
The strike is a most important factor in civil war, but in order to reach it a series of complementary
conditions are necessary which do not always exist and which very rarely come to exist
spontaneously. It is necessary to create these essential conditions, basically by explaining the
purposes of the revolution and by demonstrating the forces of the people and their possibilities.
It is also possible to have recourse to certain very homogeneous groups, which must have shown
their efficacy previously in less dangerous tasks, in order to make use of another of the terrible
arms of the guerrilla band, sabotage. It is possible to paralyze entire armies, to suspend the
industrial life of a zone, leaving the inhabitants of a city without factories, without light, without
water, without communications of any kind, without being able to risk travel by highway except at
certain hours. If all this is achieved, the morale of the enemy falls, the morale of his combatant
units weakens, and the fruit ripens for plucking at a precise moment.
All this presupposes an increase in the territory included within the guerrilla action, but an
excessive in- crease of this territory is to be avoided. It is essential always to preserve a strong
base of operations and to continue strengthening it during the course of the war. Within this
territory, measures of indoctrination of the inhabitants of the zone should be utilized; measures of
quarantine should be taken against the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution; all the purely
defensive measures, such as trenches, mines, and communications, should be perfected.
When the guerrilla band has reached a respectable power in arms and in number of combatants,
it ought to proceed to the formation of new columns. This is an act similar to that of the beehive
when at a given moment it releases a new queen, who goes to another region with a part of the
swarm. The mother hive with the most notable guerrilla chief will stay in the less dangerous
places, while the new columns will penetrate other enemy territories following the cycle already
described.
A clipă will arrive in which the territory occupied by the columns is too small for them; and in
the advance toward regions solidly defended by the enemy, it will be necessary to confront
powerful forces. At that instant the columns join, they offer a compact, fighting front, and a war of
positions is reached, a war carried on by regular armies. However, the former guerrilla army
cannot cut itself off from its base, and it should create new guerrilla bands behind the enemy
acting in the same way as the original bands operated earlier, proceeding thus to penetrate
enemy territory until it is dominated.
It is thus that guerrillas reach the stage of attack, of the encirclement of fortified bases, of the
defeat of reinforcements, of mass action, ever more ardent, in the whole national territory, arriving
finally at the objective of the war: victory.

3. GUERRILLA TACTICS
In military language, tactics are the practical methods of achieving the grand strategic objectives.

In one sense they complement strategy and in an-other they are more specific rules within it. As
means, tactics are much more variable, much more flexible than the final objectives, and they
should be adjusted continually during the struggle. There are tactical objectives that remain
constant throughout a war and others that vary. The first thing to be considered is the adjusting of
guerrilla action to the action of the enemy.
The fundamental characteristic of a guerrilla band is mobility. This permits it in a few minutes to
move far from a specific theater and in a few hours far even from the region, if that becomes
necessary; permits it constantly to change front and avoid any type of encirclement. As the
circumstances of the war require, the guerrilla band can dedicate itself exclusively to fleeing from
an encirclement which is the enemy's only way of forcing the band into a decisive fight that could
be unfavorable; it can also change the battle into a counter-encirclement (small bands of men are
presumably surrounded by the enemy when suddenly the enemy is surrounded by stronger
contingents; or men located in a safe place serve as a lure, leading to the encirclement and
annihilation of the entire troops and supply of an attacking force). Characteristic of this war of
mobility is the so-called minuet, named from the analogy with the dance: the guerrilla bands
encircle an enemy position, an advancing column, for example; they encircle it completely from
the four points of the compass, with five or six men in each place, far enough away to avoid being
encircled themselves; the fight is started at any one of the points, and the army moves toward it;
the guerrilla band then retreats, always maintaining visual contact, and initiates its attack from
another point. The army will repeat its action and the guerrilla band the same. Thus,
successively, it is possible to keep an enemy column immobilized, forcing it to expend large
quantities of ammunition and weakening the morale of its troops without incurring great dangers.
This same tactic can be applied at nighttime, closing in more and showing greater
aggressiveness, because in these conditions counter-encirclement is much more difficult.
Movement by night is another important characteristic of the guerrilla band, enabling it to
advance into position for an attack and, where the danger of betrayal exists, to mobilize in new
territory. The numerical inferiority of the guerrilla makes it necessary that attacks always be
carried out by surprise; this great advantage is what permits the guerrilla fighter to inflict losses
on the enemy without suffering losses. In a fight between a hundred men on one side and ten on
the other, losses are not equal where there is one casualty on each side. The enemy loss is
always reparable; it amounts to only one percent of his effectiveness. The loss of the guerrilla
band requires more time to be repaired because it involves a soldier of high specialization and is
ten percent of the operating forces.
A dead soldier of the guerrillas ought never to be left with his arms and his ammunition. The duty
of every guerrilla soldier whenever a companion falls is to recover immediately these extremely
precious elements of the fight. In fact, the care which must be taken of ammunition and the
method of using it are further characteristics of guerrilla warfare. In any combat between a
regular force and a guerrilla band it is always possible to know one from the other by their
different manner of fire: a great amount of firing on the part of the regular army, sporadic and
accurate shots on the part of the guerrillas.
Once one of our heroes, now dead, had to employ his machine guns for nearly five minutes,
burst after burst, in order to slow up the advance of enemy soldiers. This fact caused
considerable confusion in our forces, because they assumed from the rhythm of fire that key
position must have been taken by the enemy, since this was one of the rare occasions where
departure from the rule of saving fire had been called for because of the importance of the point
being defended.
Another fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to adapt
himself to all circumstances, and to convert to his service all of the accidents of the action.
Against the rigidity of classical methods of fighting, the guerrilla fighter invents his own tactics at
every minute of the fight and constantly surprises the enemy.
In the first place, there are only elastic positions, specific places that the enemy cannot pass, and
places of diverting him. Frequently the enemy, after easily overcoming difficulties in a gradual
advance, is surprised to find himself suddenly and solidly detained without possibilities of moving
forward. This is due to the fact that the guerrilla-defended positions, when they have been
selected on the basis of a careful study of the ground, are invulnerable. It is not the number of
attacking soldiers that counts, but the number of defending soldiers. Once that number has been

placed there, it can nearly always hold off a battalion with success. It is a major task of the chiefs
to choose well the moment and the place for defending a position without retreat.
The form of attack of a guerrilla army is also different; starting with surprise and fury, irresistible, it
suddenly converts itself into global passivity.
The surviving enemy, resting, believes that the attacker has departed; he begins to relax, to
return to the routine life of the camp or of the fortress, when suddenly a new attack bursts forth in
another place, with the same characteristics, while the main body of the guerrilla band lies in wait
to intercept reinforcements. At other times an outpost defending the camp will be suddenly
attacked by the guerrilla, dominated, and captured. The fundamental thing is surprise and rapidity
of attack.
Acts of sabotage are very important. It is necessary to distinguish clearly between sabotage, a
revolutionary and highly effective method of warfare, and terrorism, a measure that is generally
ineffective and in-discriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people and
destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution. Terrorism should be
considered a valuable tactic when it is used to put to death some noted leader of the oppressing
forces well known for his cruelty, his efficiency in repression, or other quality that makes his
elimination useful. But the killing of persons of small importance is never advisable, since it brings
on an increase of reprisals, including deaths.
There is one point very much in controversy in Opinions about terrorism. Many consider that its
use, by provoking police oppression, hinders all more or less legal or semiclandestine contact
with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical
moment. This is correct; but it also happens that in a civil war the repression by the governmental
power in certain towns is already so great that, in fact, every type of legal action is suppressed
already, and any action of the masses that is not supported by arms is impossible. It is therefore
necessary to be circumspect in adopting methods of this type and to consider the consequences
that they may bring for the revolution. At any rate, well-managed sabotage is always a very
effective arm, though it should not be employed to put means of production out of action, leaving
a sector of the population paralyzed (and thus without work) unless this paralysis affects the
normal life of the society. It is ridiculous to carry out sabotage against a soft-drink factory, but it is
absolutely correct and advisable to carry out sabotage against a power plant. In the first case, a
certain number of workers are put out of a job but nothing is done to modify the rhythm of
industrial life; in the second case, there will again be displaced workers, but this is entirely
justified by the paralysis of the life of the region. We will return to the technique of sabotage later.
One of the favorite arms of the enemy army, supposed to be decisive in modern times, is
aviation. Nevertheless, this has no use whatsoever during the period that guerrilla warfare is in its
first stages, with small concentrations of men in rugged places. The utility of aviation lies in the
systematic destruction of visible and organized defenses; and for this there must be large
concentrations of men who construct these defenses, something that does not exist in this type of
warfare. Planes are also potent against marches by columns through level places or places
without cover; however, this latter danger is easily avoided by carrying out the marches at night.
One of the weakest points of the enemy is transportation by road and railroad. It is virtually
impossible to maintain a vigil yard by yard over a transport line, a road, or a railroad. At any point
a considerable amount of explosive charge can be planted that will make the road impassable; or
by exploding it at the moment that a vehicle passes, a consider-able loss in lives and materiel to
the enemy is caused at the same time that the road is cut.
The sources of explosives are varied. They can be brought from other zones; or use can be
made of bombs seized from the dictatorship, though these do not always work; or they can be
manufactured in secret laboratories within the guerrilla zone. The technique of setting them off is
quite varied; their manufacture also depends upon the conditions of the guerrilla band.
In our laboratory we made powder which we used as a cap, and we invented various devices for
exploding the mines at the desired moment. The ones that gave the best results were electric.
The first mine that we exploded was a bomb dropped from an aircraft of the dictatorship. We
adapted it by inserting various caps and adding a gun with the trigger pulled by a cord. At the
moment that an enemy truck passed, the weapon was fired to set off the explosion.

These techniques can be developed to a high degree. We have information that in Algeria, for
example, tele-explosive mines, that is, mines exploded by radio at great distances from the point
where they are located, are being used today against the French colonial power.
The technique of lying in ambush along roads in order to explode mines and annihilate survivors
is one of the most remunerative in point of ammunition and arms. The surprised enemy does not
use his ammunition and has no time to flee; so with a small expenditure of ammunition large
results are achieved. As blows are dealt the enemy, he also changes his tactics, and in place of
isolated trucks, veritable motorized columns move. However, by choosing the ground well, the
same result can be produced by breaking the column and concentrating forces on one vehicle. In
these cases the essential elements of guerrilla tactics must always be kept in mind. These are:
perfect knowledge of the ground; surveillance and foresight as to the lines of escape; vigilance
over all the secondary roads that can bring support to the point of attack; intimacy with people in
the zone so as to have sure help from them in respect to supplies, transport, and temporary or
permanent hiding places if it becomes necessary to leave wounded companions behind;
numerical superiority at a chosen point of action; total mobility; and the possibility of counting on
reserves.
If all these tactical requisites are fulfilled, surprise attack along the lines of communication of the
enemy yields notable dividends.
A fundamental part of guerrilla tactics is the treatment accorded the people of the zone. Even the
treatment accorded the enemy is important; the norm to be followed should be an absolute
inflexibility at the time of attack, an absolute inflexibility toward all the despicable elements that
resort to informing and assassination, and clemency as absolute as possible to-ward the enemy
soldiers who go into the fight performing or believing that they perform a military duty. It is a good
policy, so long as there are no considerable bases of operations and invulnerable places, to take
no prisoners. Survivors ought to be set free. The wounded should be cared for with all possible
resources at the time of the action. Conduct toward the civil population ought to be regulated by a
large respect for all the rules and traditions of the people of the zone, in order to demonstrate
effectively, with deeds, the moral superiority of the guerrilla fighter over the oppressing soldier.
Except in deosebit situations, there ought to be no execution of justice without giving the criminal
an opportunity to clear himself.

4. WARFARE ON FAVORABLE GROUND
As we have already said, guerrilla fighting will not always take place in country most favorable to
the employment of its tactics; but when it does, that is, when the guerrilla band is located in zones
difficult to reach, either because of dense forests, steep mountains, impassable deserts or
marshes, the general tactics, based on the fundamental postulates of guerrilla warfare, must
always be the same. An important point to consider is the moment for making contact with the
enemy. If the zone is so thick, so difficult that an organized army can never reach it, the guerrilla
band should advance to the regions where the army can arrive and where there will be a
possibility of combat.
As soon as the survival of the guerrilla band has been assured, it should fight; it must constantly
go out from its refuge to fight. Its mobility does not have to be as great as in those cases where
the ground is unfavorable; it must adjust itself to the capabilities of the enemy, but it is not
necessary to be able to move as quickly as in places where the enemy can concentrate a large
number of men in a few minutes. Neither is the nocturnal character of this warfare so important; it
will be possible in many cases to carry out daytime operations, especially mobilizations by day,
though subjected to enemy observation by land and air. It is also possible to persist in a military
action for a much longer time, above all in the mountains; it is possible to undertake battles of
long duration with very few men, and it is very probable that the arrival of enemy reinforcements
at the scene of the fight can be prevented.
A close watch over the points of access is, however, an axiom never to be forgotten by the
guerrilla fighter. His aggressiveness (on account of the difficulties that the enemy faces in
bringing up reinforcements) can he greater, he can approach the enemy more closely, fight much
more directly, more frontally and for a longer time, though these rules may be qualified by various
circumstances, such, for example, as the amount of ammunition.
Fighting on favorable ground and particularly in the mountains presents many advantages but
also the inconvenience that it is difficult to capture in a single operation a considerable quantity of

arms and ammunition, owing to the precautions that the enemy takes in these regions. (The
guerrilla soldier must never forget the fact that it is the enemy that must serve as his source of
supply of ammunition and arms.) But much more rapidly than in unfavorable ground the guerrilla
band will here be able to "dig in," that is, to form a base capable of engaging in a war of positions,
where small industries may be in-stalled as they are needed, as well as hospitals, centers for
education and training, storage facilities, organs of propaganda, etc., adequately protected from
aviation or from long-range artillery.
The guerrilla band in these conditions can number many more personnel; there will be
noncombatants and perhaps even a system of training in the use of the arms that eventually are
to fall into the power of the guerrilla army.
The number of men that a guerrilla band can have is a matter of extremely flexible calculation
adapted to the territory, to the means available of acquiring supplies, to the mass flights of
oppressed people from other zones, to the arms available, to the necessities of organization. But,
in any case, it is much more practicable to establish a base and expand with the support of new
combatant elements. The radius of action of a guerrilla band of this type can be as wide as
conditions or the operations of other bands in adjacent territory permit. The range will be limited
by the time that it takes to arrive at a zone of security from the zone of operation; assuming that
marches must be made at night, it will not be possible to operate more than five or six hours
away from a point of maximum security. Small guerrilla bands that work constantly at weakening
a territory can go farther away from the zone of security.
The arms preferable for this type of warfare are long-range weapons requiring small expenditure
of bullets, supported by a group of automatic or semi-automatic arms. Of the rifles and machine
guns that exist in the markets of the United States, one of the best is the M-1 rifle, called the
Garand. However, only people with some experience should use this, since it has the
disadvantage of expending too much ammunition. Medium-heavy arms, such as tripod machine
guns, can be used on favorable ground, affording a greater margin of security for the weapon and
its personnel, but they ought always to be a means of repelling an enemy and not for attack.
An ideal composition for a guerrilla band of 25 men would be: 10 to 15 single-shot rifles and
about 10 automatic arms between Garands and hand machine guns, including light and easily
portable automatic arms, such as the Browning or the more modern Belgian FAL and M-14
automatic rifles. Among the hand machine-guns the best are those of nine millimeters, which
permit a larger transport of ammunition. The simpler its construction the better, because this
increases the case of switching parts. All this must be adjusted to the armament that the enemy
uses, Since the ammunition that he employs is what we are going to use when his arms fall into
our hands. It is practically impossible for heavy arms to be used. Aircraft cannot see anything and
cease to operate; tanks and cannons cannot do much owing to the difficulties of advancing in
these zones.
A very important consideration is supply. In general, the zones of difficult access for this very
reason present singular problems, since there are few peasants, and therefore animal and food
supplies are scarce. It is necessary to maintain stable lines of communication in order to be able
always to count on a minimum of food, stockpiled, in the event of any disagreeable development.
In this kind of zone of operations the possibilities of sabotage on a large scale are generally not
present; with the inaccessibility goes a lack of constructions, telephone lines, aqueducts, etc.,
that could be damaged by direct action.
For supply purposes it is important to have animals, among which the mule is the best in rough
country. Adequate pasturage permitting good nutrition is essential. The mule can pass through
extremely hilly country impossible for other animals. In the most difficult situations it is necessary
to resort to transport by men. Each individual can carry twenty-five kilograms for many hours daily
and for many days.
The lines of communication with the exterior should conține a series of intermediate points
manned by people of complete reliability, where products can be stored and where contacts can
go to hide themselves at critical times. Internal lines of communication can also be created. Their
extension will be determined by the stage of development reached by the guerrilla band. In some
zones of operations in the recent Cuban war, telephone lines of many kilometers of length were
established, roads were built, and a messenger service maintained sufficient to cover all zones in
a minimum of time.

There are also other possible means of communication, not used in the Cuban war but perfectly
applicable, such as smoke signals, signals with sunshine reflected by mirrors, and carrier
pigeons.
The vital necessities of the guerrillas are to maintain their arms in good condition, to capture
ammunition, and, above everything else, to have adequate shoes. The first manufacturing efforts
should therefore be directed toward these objectives. Shoe factories can initially be cobbler
installations that replace halfsoles on old shoes, expanding afterwards into a series of organized
factories with a good average daily production of shoes. The manufacture of powder is fairly
simple; and much can be accomplished by having a small laboratory and bringing in the
necessary materials from outside. Mined areas constitute a grave danger for the enemy; large
areas can be mined for simultaneous explosion, destroying up to hundreds of men.

5. WARFARE ON UNFAVORABLE GROUND
In order to carry on warfare in country that is not very hilly, lacks forests, and has many roads, all
the fundamental requisites of guerrilla warfare must be observed; only the forms will be altered.
The quantity, not the quality, of guerrilla warfare will change. For example, following the same
order as before, the mobility of this type of guerrilla should be extraordinary; strikes should be
made preferably at night; they should be extremely rapid but the guerrilla should move to places
different from the starting point, the farthest possible from the scene of action, assuming that
there is no place secure from the repressive forces that the guerrilla can use as its garrison.
A man can walk between 30 and 50 kilometers during the night hours; it is possible also to march
during the first hours of daylight, unless the zones of operation are closely watched or there is
danger that people in the vicinity, seeing the passing troops, will notify the pursuing army of the
location of the guerrilla band and its route. It is always preferable in these cases to operate at
night with the greatest possible silence both before and after the action; the first hours of night
are best. Here too there are exceptions to the general rule, since at times the dawn hours will be
preferable. It is never wise to habituate the enemy to a certain form of warfare; it is necessary to
vary constantly the places, the hours, and the forms of operation.
We have already said that the action cannot endure for long, but must be rapid; it must be of a
high degree of effectiveness, last a few minutes, and be followed by an immediate withdrawal.
The arms employed here will not be the same as in the case of actions on favorable ground; a
large quantity of automatic weapons is to be preferred. In night attacks marksmanship is not the
determining factor, but rather concentration of fire; the more automatic arms firing at short
distance, the more possibilities there are of annihilating the enemy.
Also, the use of mines in roads and the destruction of bridges are tactics of great importance.
Attacks by the guerrilla will be less aggressive so far as the persistence and continuation are
concerned, but they can be very violent, and they can utilize different arms, such as mines and
the shotgun. Against open vehicles heavily loaded with men, which is the usual method of
transporting troops, and even against closed vehicles that do not have aparte defenses- against
buses, for example-the shotgun is a tremendous weapon. A shotgun loaded with large shot is the
most effective. This is not a secret of guerrilla fighters; it is used also in big wars. The Americans
used shotgun platoons armed with high-quality weapons and bayonets for assaulting machine-
gun nests.
There is an important problem to explain, that of ammunition; this will almost always be taken
from the enemy. It is therefore necessary to strike blows where there will be the absolute
assurance of restoring the ammunition expended, unless there are large reserves in secure
places. In other words, an annihilating attack against a group of men is not to be under-taken at
the risk of expending all ammunition without being able to replace it. Always in guerrilla tactics it
is necessary to keep in mind the grave problem of procuring the war materiel necessary for
continuing the fight. For this reason guerrilla arms ought to be the same as those used by the
enemy, except for weapons such as revolvers and shotguns, for which the ammunition can be
obtained in the zone itself or in the cities.
The number of men that a guerrilla band of this type should include does not exceed ten to
fifteen. In forming a single combat unit it is of great importance always to consider the limitations
on numbers: ten, twelve, fifteen men can hide anywhere and at the same time can help each
other in putting up a powerful resistance to the enemy. Four or five would perhaps be too small a

number, but when the number exceeds ten the possibility that the enemy will discover them in
their camp or on the march is much greater.
Remember that the velocity of the guerrilla band on the march is equal to the velocity of its
slowest man. It is more difficult to find uniformity of marching speed with twenty, thirty, or forty
men than with ten. And the guerrilla fighter on the plain must be fundamentally a runner. Here the
practice of hitting and running acquires its maximum use. The guerrilla bands on the plain suffer
the enormous inconvenience of being subject to a rapid encirclement and of not having sure
places where they can set up a firm resistance; therefore they must live in conditions of absolute
secrecy for a long time, since it would be dangerous to trust any neighbor whose fidelity is not
perfectly established. The reprisals of the enemy are so violent, usually so brutal, inflicted not
only on the head of the family but frequently on the women and children as well, that pressure on
individuals lacking firmness may result at any moment in their giving way and revealing
information as to where the guerrilla band is located and how it is operating. This would
immediately cauzează an encirclement with consequences always disagreeable, although not
necessarily fatal. When conditions, the quantity of arms, and the state of insurrection of the
people call for an increase in the number of men, the guerrilla band should be divided. If it is
necessary, all can rejoin at a given moment to deal a blow, but in such a way that immediately
afterwards they can disperse toward separate zones, a gain divided into small groups of ten,
twelve, or fifteen men.
It is entirely feasible to organize whole armies under a single command and to assure respect
and obedience to this command without the necessity of being in a single group. Therefore the
election of the guerrilla chiefs and the certainty that they coordinate ideologically and personally
with the overall chief of the zone are very important.
The bazooka is a heavy weapon that can be used by the guerrilla band because of its easy
portability and operation. Today the rifle-fired anti-tank grenade can replace it. Naturally, it will be
a weapon taken from the enemy. The bazooka is excelent for firing on armored vehicles, and even
on unarmored vehicles that are loaded with troops, and for taking small military bases of few men
in a short time; but it is important to point out that not more than three shells per man can be
carried, and this only with considerable exertion.
As for the utilization of heavy arms taken from the enemy, nothing is to be scorned. But there are
weapons such as the tripod machine gun, the heavy fifty-millimeter machine gun3 etc., that, when
captured, can be utilized with a willingness to lose them again. In other words, in the unfavorable
conditions that we are now analyzing, a battle to defend a heavy machine gun or other weapon of
this type cannot be allowed; they are simply to be used until the tactical moment when they must
be abandoned. In our Cuban war of liberation, to abandon a weapon constituted a grave offense,
and there was never any case where the necessity arose. Nevertheless, we mention this case in
order to explain clearly the only situation in which abandonment would not constitute an occasion
for reproaches. On unfavorable ground, the guerrilla weapon is the personal weapon of iute fire.
Easy access to the zone usually means that it will be habitable and that there will be a peasant
population in these places. This facilitates supply enormously. Having trustworthy people and
making contact with establishments that provide supplies to the population, it is possible to
maintain a guerrilla band perfectly well without having to devote time or money to long and
dangerous lines of communication. Also it is well to reiterate that the smaller the number of men
the easier it will be to procure food for them. Essential supplies such as bedding, waterproof
material, mosquito netting, shoes, medicines, and food will be found directly in the zone, since
they are things of daily use by its inhabitants.
Communications will be much easier in the sense of being able to count on a larger number of
men and more roads; but they will be more difficult as a problem of security for messages
between distant points, since it will be necessary to rely on a series of contacts that have to be
trusted. There will be the danger of an eventual capture of one of the messengers, who are
constantly crossing enemy zones. If the messages are of small importance, they should be oral; if
of great importance, code writing should be used. Experience shows that transmission by word of
mouth greatly distorts any communication.
For these same reasons manufacture will have much less importance, at the same time that it
would be much more difficult to carry it out. It will not be possible to have factories making shoes
or arms. Practically speaking, manufacture will have to be limited to small shops, carefully

hidden, where shotgun shells can be recharged and mines, simple grenades, and other minimum
necessities of the moment manufactured. On the other hand, it is possible to make use of all the
friendly shops of the zone for such work as is necessary.
This brings us to two consequences that flow logically from what has been said. One of them is
that the favorable conditions for establishing a permanent camp in guerrilla warfare are inverse to
the degree of productive development of a place. All favorable conditions, all facilities of life
normally induce men to settle; but for the guerrilla band the opposite is the case. The more
facilities there are for social life, the more nomadic, the more uncertain the life of the guerrilla
fighter. These really are the results of one and the same principle. The title of this section is "War
on Unfavorable Ground," because everything that is favorable to human life, communications,
urban and semi-urban concentrations of large numbers of people, land easily worked by
machine, all these place the guerrilla fighter in a disadvantageous situation.
The second conclusion is that if guerrilla fighting must include me extremely important faction of
work on the masses, this work is even more important in the unfavorable zones, where a single
enemy attack can produce a catastrophe. Indoctrination should be continuous, and so should be
the struggle for unity of the workers, of the peasants, and of other social classes that live in the
zone, in order to achieve toward the guerrilla fighters a maximum homogeneity of attitude. This
task with the masses, this constant work at the huge problem of relations of the guerrilla band
with the inhabitants of the zone, must also govern the attitude to be taken toward the case of an
individual recalcitrant enemy soldier: he should be eliminated without hesitation when he is
dangerous. In this respect the guerrilla band must be drastic. Enemies cannot be permitted to
exist within the zone of operations in places that offer no security.

6. SUBURBAN WARFARE
If during the war the guerrilla bands close in on cities and penetrate the surrounding country in
such a way as to be able to establish themselves in conditions of some security, it will be
necessary to give these suburban bands a special education, or rather, a special organization.
It is fundamental to recognize that a suburban guerrilla band can never spring up of its own
accord. It will be born only after certain conditions necessary for its survival have been created.
Therefore, the suburban guerrilla will always be under the direct orders of chiefs located in
another zone. The function of this guerrilla band will not be to carry out independent actions but
to coordinate its activities with overall strategic plans in such a way as to support the action of
larger groups situated in another area, contributing specifically to the success of a fixed tactical
objective, without the operational freedom of guerrilla bands of the other types. For example, a
suburban band will not be able to choose among the operations of destroying telephone lines,
moving to make attacks in another locality, and surprising a patrol of soldiers on a distant road; it
will do exactly what it is told. If its function is to cut down telephone poles or electric wires, to
destroy sewers, railroads, or water mains, it will limit itself to carrying out these tasks efficiently.
It ought not to number more than four or five men. The limitation on numbers is important,
because the suburban guerrilla must be considered as situated in exceptionally unfavorable
ground, where the vigilance of the enemy will be much greater and the possibilities of reprisals as
well as of betrayal are increased enormously. Another aggravating circumstance is that the
suburban guerrilla band cannot depart far from the places where it is going to operate. To speed
of action and withdrawal there must be added a limitation on the distance of withdrawal from the
scene of action and the need to remain totally hidden during the daytime. This is a nocturnal
guerrilla band in the extreme, without possibilities of changing its manner of operating until the
insurrection is so far advanced that it can take part as an active combatant in the siege of the city.
The essential qualities of the guerrilla fighter in this situation are discipline (perhaps in the highest
degree of all) and discretion. He cannot count on more than two or three friendly houses that will
provide food; it is almost certain that an encirclement in these conditions will be equivalent to
death. Weapons, furthermore, will not be of the same kind as those of the other groups. They will
be for personal defense, of the type that do not hinder a rapid flight or betray a secure hiding
place. As their armament the band ought to have not more than one carbine or one sawed-off
shotgun, or perhaps two, with pistols for the other members.
They will concentrate their action on prescribed sabotage and never carry out armed attacks,
except by surprising one or two members or agents of the enemy troops.

For sabotage they need a full set of instruments. The guerrilla fighter must have good saws, large
quantities of dynamite, picks and shovels, apparatus for lifting rails, and, in general, adequate
mechanical equipment for the work to be carried out. This should be hidden in places that are
secure but easily accessible to the hands that will need to use it.
If there is more than one guerrilla band, they will all be under a single chief who will give orders
as to the necessary tasks through contacts of proven trustworthiness who live openly as ordinary
citizens. In certain cases the guerrilla fighter will be able to maintain his peacetime work, but this
is very difficult. Practically speaking, the suburban guerrilla band is a group of men who are
already outside the law, in a condition of war, situated as unfavorably as we have described.
The importance of a suburban struggle has usually been underestimated; it is really very great. A
good operation of this type extended over a wide area paralyzes almost completely the
commercial and industrial life of the sector and places the entire population in a situation of
unrest, of anguish, almost of impatience for the development of violent events that will relieve the
period of suspense. If from the first moment of the war, thought is taken for the future possibility
of this type of fight and an organization of specialists started, a much more rapid action will be
assured, and with it a saving of lives and of the priceless time of the nation.

CHAPTER II: THE GUERRILLA BAND

1. THE GUERRILLA FIGHTER: SOCIAL REFORMER
We have already described the guerrilla fighter as one who shares the longing of the people for
liberation and who, once peaceful means are exhausted, initiates the fight and converts himself
into an armed vanguard of the fighting people. From the very beginning of the struggle he has the
intention of destroying an unjust order and therefore an intention, more or less hidden, to replace
the old with something new.
We have also already said that in the conditions that prevail, at least in America and in almost all
countries with deficient economic development, it is the countryside that offers ideal conditions
for the fight. Therefore the foundation of the social structure that the guerrilla fighter will build
begins with changes in the ownership of agrarian property.
The banner of the fight throughout this period will be agrarian reform. At first this goal may or may
not be completely delineated in its extent and limits; it may simply refer to the age-old hunger of
the peasant for the land on which he works or wishes to work.
The conditions in which the agrarian reform will be realized depend upon the conditions which
existed before the struggle began, and on the social depth of the struggle. But the guerrilla
fighter, as a person conscious of a role in the vanguard of the people, must have a moral conduct
that shows him to be a true priest of the reform to which he aspires. To the stoicism imposed by
the difficult conditions of warfare should be added an austerity born of rigid self-control that will
prevent a single excess, a single slip, whatever the circumstances. The guerrilla soldier should
be an ascetic.
As for social relations, these will vary with the development of the war. At the beginning it will not
be possible to attempt any changes in the social order.
Merchandise that cannot be paid for in cash will be paid for with bonds; and these should be
redeemed at the first opportunity.
The peasant must always be helped technically, economically, morally, and culturally. The
guerrilla fighter will be a sort of guiding angel who has fallen into the zone, helping the poor
always and bothering the rich as little as possible in the first phases of the war. But this war will
continue on its course; contradictions will continuously become sharper; the moment will arrive
when many of those who regarded the revolution with a certain sympathy at the outset will place
themselves in a position diametrically opposed; and they will take the first step into battle against
the popular forces. At that moment the guerrilla fighter should act to make himself into the
standard bearer of the cause of the people, punishing every betrayal with justice. Private property
should acquire in the war zones its social function. For example, excess land and livestock not
essential for the maintenance of a wealthy family should pass into the hands of the people and
be distributed equitably and justly.
The right of the owners to receive payment for possessions used for the social good ought
always to be respected; but this payment will be made in bonds ("bonds of hope," as they were
called by our teacher, General Bayo,3 referring to the common interest that is thereby

established between debtor and creditor). The land and property of notorious and active enemies
of the revolution should pass immediately into the hands of the revolutionary forces, Furthermore,
taking advantage of the heat of the war-those moments in which human fraternity reaches its
highest intensity-all kinds of cooperative work, as much as the mentality of the inhabitants will
permit, ought to be stimulated.
The guerrilla fighter as a social reformer should not only provide an example in his own life but he
ought also constantly to give orientation in ideological problems, explaining what he knows and
what he wishes to do at the right time. He will also make use of what he learns as the months or
years of the war strengthen his revolutionary convictions, making him more radical as the
potency of arms is demonstrated, as the outlook of the inhabitants becomes a part of his spirit
and of his own life, and as he understands the justice and the vital necessity of a series of
changes, of which the theoretical importance appeared to him be-fore, but devoid of practical
urgency.
This development occurs very often, because the initiators of guerrilla warfare or rather the
directors of guerrilla warfare, are not men who have bent their backs day after day over the
furrow. They are men who understand the necessity for changes in the social treatment accorded
peasants, without having suffered in the usual case this bitter treatment in their own persons. It
happens then (I am drawing on the Cuban experience and enlarging it) that a genuine interaction
is produced between these leaders, who with their acts teach the people the fundamental
importance of the armed fight, and the people themselves who rise in rebellion and teach the
leaders these practical necessities of which we speak. Thus, as a product of this interaction
between the guerrilla fighter and his people, a progressive radicalization appears which further
accentuates the revolutionary characteristics of the movement and gives it